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Abstract
Based on a normative orientation and an interdisciplinary perspective, this is a comparative study, using the process tracing
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tional decision‐making processes evidence a change. The study concluded that the EU democratic deficit remains, which
assumes special features in economic crises, providing a political oversize power to the economically hegemonic states,
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1. Introduction
Eurozone debt and Covid‐19 economic crises can be con‐
sidered as ‘critical junctures’ (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422;
Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–126; Ladi & Tsarouhas,
2020, pp. 1042, 1051–1052; Schmidt, 2020, pp. 1179,
1182), understood as a sequence of abnormal and
unexpected events, exogenous to the political system,
requiring reactions and answers that may result in
institutional change, impacting political institutions and
policies (Capoccia, 2015; Stark, 2018). Therefore, they
are also opportune moments for assessing the demo‐
cratic legitimacy of the EU.
Based on a comparative analysis of the EU responses
to both crises, this research assesses the importance of
the constitutional design to allow politically balanced
outcomes and prevent economically biased decisions.
The study departs from the hypothesis that the exist‐
ing institutional design leads to an oversized political
power of a few economically hegemonic states, tending
to achieve inexpedient outcomes and to reproduce struc‐
tural economic imbalances. The research is normative‐
oriented, relying on the importance of the constitutional
architecture of the EU in the context of economic crises
to grant democratic legitimisation.
The first part of the article presents the methodolog‐
ical approach that is used, the second provides a theo‐
retical review of the democratic deficit in the EU, while
the third part presents a short description of responses
to crises; finally, the fourth section delivers the empirical
analysis supporting the hypothesis and anticipating lines
for discussion and conclusions.
2. Methodology and Empirical Analysis
Process tracing (PT) methodology is used for empirical
qualitative analysis of the institutional reforms and pol‐
icy outcomes following the Eurozone and Covid‐19 crises.
PT is a causal inference methodology based on a diag‐
nosis of causal activities and/or events to build ratio‐
nal arguments for hypothesised explanations of a cer‐
tain phenomenon (Bennett, 2010, p. 208). An accurate
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qualitative analysis to observe causal mechanisms is
made (Beach & Pederson, 2016, p. 163; Collier, 2011,
pp. 823–824), through a detailed and sequencedmethod
for rational inference, grounded in tracing previous
events of a result to argue its causes and provide the‐
oretical hypotheses to the outcomes’ causality. It may
be a means to both testing and building theories, or to
merely explaining an outcome (Beach & Pederson, 2016,
p. 2). This research uses theory‐testing approach to PT
to find evidence that the already theorised democratic
deficit is the cause of the hypothesis posed, intending
to demonstrate that despite evidences of policy change
in Covid‐19 crisis, the same democratic perversion hap‐
pened in institutional mechanisms.
Theory‐testing‐driven PT takes theory from literature
to demonstrate that it is present in the form of causal
mechanisms—events/activities observed and subject to
inference—fostering a certain outcome. It is viable when
a grounded theory already exists from which a plausi‐
ble mechanism may be deduced and forward‐tested in a
case study (Beach & Pederson, 2016, pp. 12–15, 29, 164).
The further identified causal mechanisms are defined as
derivations of the democratic deficit underpinning the
rationale of this research. Therefore, X and Y must be
present in the PT inference, where X is hypothesised to
lead to Y (Bennett, 2010, p. 209). In this research, X is
defined as the democratic deficit and Y as the oversized
political power of the economically hegemonic states.
To prove the correlation, events/activities are described,
reasoned and conceptualised as manifestations of X,
that is, of the theory on which the analysis is based
(Collier, 2011, pp. 824, 825). Primary and secondary
sources are used, such as institutional EU documents,
political testimonies, news media, and scientific litera‐
ture, covering the 2009–2015 period, the peak of the
Eurozone debt crisis, and the period between February
and September 2020, related to the analysis during the
pandemic. The PT approach is rooted on a normative ori‐
entation, derived from the democratic deficit theorisa‐
tion of the EU political system, and specifically the EMU
institutional architecture.
3. On the Democratic Deficit of the EU and EMU
The EU and the EMU have long been diagnosed by schol‐
ars as suffering from democratic deficit and legitimacy.
Although these two terminologies may overlap when
assessing democracy in the EU, they have differences
when considering the criteria and scope of assessment of
a political system. While the democratic deficit is based
on the principle of a constitutional design correspond‐
ing to representative democracy for legitimising the exer‐
cise of power, legitimacy, although it may entail premises
of democratic procedures, aims at assessing the degree
and breadth of recognition by the people of the exer‐
cise of authority. For legitimacy to be achieved, people
should not only recognise that a government exercises
the power, but also that it has the right to have that
authority. Even though a democratic based constitution
is an important criterion for that recognition, other fac‐
tors are important, as the governmental outputs, the
habit to it, and historical and identity issues (Shively,
2011, pp. 185–188). So, a political system can be demo‐
cratic deficient but enjoy legitimacy by its people, and
the other way around. Whereas the democratic deficit
debate deals with the need for democracy to procedu‐
rally legitimise the EU’s authority, the legitimacy deficit
studies deal with the substantive approval of EU gover‐
nance (de Jongh & Theuns, 2017).
Such assumption helps to understand why in the first
decades of integration, outputs appeared to be sufficient
to legitimise the EU (Habermas, 2013, p. 2), while last‐
ing peace and economic growth sided by the welfare
state pleased the electorate (Sebastião, 2020, p. 139).
This permissive consensus (Inglehart, 1970) was propi‐
tious for questioning democracy as being inadequate to
conceptualise the EU, as it could be alternatively con‐
ceived as a regulatory state (Majone, 1996), where the
Pareto principle operated. This meets the conceptuali‐
sation of results as pertinent criteria to observe legiti‐
macy, as advocated by Scharpf (1999), backed by the
systemic approach to political systems: Despite the effec‐
tive outputs for citizens, the citizens’ participation in the
governing process, through parties and elections—the
inputs—were also important (de Jongh & Theuns, 2017,
p. 1286; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013, pp. 4–5). Outputs
stood out as legitimisers in literature (Caporaso& Tarrow,
2008; see alsoMenon andWeatherill, as cited in Schmidt,
2013, p. 11), but systemic‐based studies even devel‐
oped throughput as a third criteria (Schmidt, 2013, p. 7),
coincident with the institutional procedures of the EU,
that should ensure effectiveness, accountability, trans‐
parency, inclusion and openness to civil society (Schmidt,
2013, pp. 15–19).
Nevertheless, outputs have been controversial
as legitimisers, and the 2008 crisis reinforced this
notion, leading some authors to review those pre‐
sumptions (Scharpf, 2010). For Follesdal and Hix (2006,
pp. 543–545), the central question is how to define
effective outputs. This is a matter of politics and democ‐
racy, requiring competition and opposition, not only to
elect the best policy but even more important for choos‐
ing an alternative government when policy outcomes
have disappointed citizens. When outputs are not sat‐
isfactory, what is questioned is not the legitimacy, but
rather the effectiveness of a government. However, it
is indeed these moments that demonstrate a perma‐
nent dialectics between legitimacy and people’s expec‐
tations regarding the democratic procedures (de Jongh
& Theuns, 2017, pp. 1288–1292). Political competition
and majority‐based institutions are even more crucial
when outcomes have not lived up to citizens’ expec‐
tations and an alternative is needed. In fact, despite
the political empowerment of the European Parliament
(EP), it has not been proportional to the range of com‐
petences transferred from national parliaments to the
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EU. Intergovernmentalism weighs too heavily on the bal‐
ance of powers (Schmidt, 2007, p. 521), and this has
remained unchanged even with Spitzenkandidat (Moury,
2016, pp. 38–48), making the EU a kind of “imperfect
bicameralism” (Moreira, 2017, p. 55).
These claims depart from the premises of repre‐
sentative democracy, underpinning the EU democratic
deficit arguments, assumed as the theoretical rationale
of this research. Free and competitive elections are
the pillar of representative democracy, electing offi‐
cers, that are mediators of social conflicts, represent‐
ing the electorate, and holding legislative and executive
power. Most representative democracies are parliamen‐
tary systems, where government emerges from the party
leader, or coalition, winning a majority of votes in parlia‐
ment through the general election. Parliament and gov‐
ernment exert legislative and executive power respec‐
tively, with a close interdependent relation. Another
model of representative democracy is the presidential
one. A president is elected by universal suffrage, assum‐
ing both the executive and head of state roles, with
great independence from the parliament, that holds leg‐
islative power. There’s still semi‐presidential and semi‐
parliamentary models, which share characteristics of the
former two, withmore or less executive or control power
by the president vis‐à‐vis the government (Delwit, 2015,
pp. 146–155; Fernandes, 2010, pp. 148–158).
Based on representative democracy premises, this
research shares Hix and Hoyland’s (2011, p. 131) judg‐
ment, that a truly democratic EU would require elec‐
tions to be the provenience of the main political offices
(as the President of the Commission) and the control of
the political agenda. Political competition in EP elections
would provide voters with policy platforms or candidates
for office and allow alternative choices when a mandate
defrauded citizens’ expectations. The authors have five
main arguments for democratic deficit in the EU: (1) The
EU decisions are too dependent on executive actors, as
the governmental ones, (2) EP power remains too weak,
once its empowerment was not proportional to the loss
of national parliaments’ power, (3) there is an absence of
truly European elections, given the ‘domestic’ logic of EP
elections, (4) there remains a distance of the EU from its
citizens, considering the complex institutional design and
the secrecy features of some institutions and (5) EU poli‐
cies are not a translation of the majority of European cit‐
izens’ preferences (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, pp. 132–133).
These claims are flagrant in the EMU architectural
design, particularly within the economic governance.
Furthermore, when considering the dialects between
EMU norm and political economy, democracy is subject
to particular perversion.
3.1. EMU and Democracy Constraints in a Multilevel
Polity
Institutionalised in the Treaty of Maastricht, under the
German ordoliberal model (Habermas, 2013, p. 3; Lang,
2004), the EMU operationalises the monetarist ideol‐
ogy (Bellamy & Weale, 2015, p. 259) through two dif‐
ferent forms of governance: a ‘federal’ one, govern‐
ing monetary policy under the European Central Bank
(ECB) political independent authority, and a national
coordination for economic policy. This accommodated
a supranational monetary policy, but the denial of EU
co‐responsibility for Eurozone fiscal balances, designing
the EMU as a non‐optimum currency area. Whereas
monetary policy is supranational, under the ECB political
independence to maintain price stability (Chang, 2009,
p. 68), the economic policy is a national competence, but
subject to very strict coordination, preventive, surveil‐
lance, and punitive mechanisms by the EU, ensured by
a reinforced intergovernmentalism, through the open
method of coordination. The Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) is the central instrument of this economic gover‐
nance, setting limits for national public debts anddeficits,
as well as margins for inflation and interest rates, to
ensure prices stability, credit markets confidence, and
thus the soundness of the single currency, on the benefit
of all the Eurozonemembers (Chang, 2009, pp. 124–125;
Silva, 2017, pp. 69–73). So, while the EMU deprived
national governments of a traditional macroeconomic
instrument, as themonetary policy, important to face cri‐
sis and asymmetric shocks, the EU did not assume a cor‐
respondent competence with supranational instruments
to ensure it, leaving it under exclusive national responsi‐
bility. Furthermore, given the great economic structural
differences between the Member States, a single cur‐
rency and a macroeconomic policy on the type of one
size fits all, was likely to replicate national imbalances
and generate economic irrationalities—as the competi‐
tive and unfair national fiscal policies with dichotomous
effects across Member States (Lang, 2004, pp. 151–157;
Ruchet, 1998, pp. 168–177). As fiscal instruments rested
to be one of the few national automatic stabilizers, each
state would adopt the ones that its structural economic
position in EMU is in advantage for, thus engaging in
national fiscal competition.
Although this multi‐level governance is underpinned
by legal constitutional principles conferring normative
legitimacy to the EMU (Bellamy & Weale, 2015, p. 259),
when considering implications for the normal process
of democratic politics, the imposed restrictions to pub‐
lic finances limit ideological competition over political
economy, the reason Bellamy and Weale (2015, p. 259)
assume EMU represents a kind of neoliberal institutional‐
ization. This is what the German constitutionalist Dieter
Grimm (cited in Habermas, 2015, p. 547) identifies as
the “constitutional status” of some EU policies, which
turn them immune to the normal process of variation
in politics, one of the causes for the distance of the
EU from the citizens. Such a conditioned EMU tight‐
ens the ideological options between the traditional pro‐
liberal and pro‐Keynesian stances of the political econ‐
omy of European democracies, thus depoliticizing eco‐
nomic options (Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018, pp. 11–12).
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This is very clear when considering the clash of for‐
mal national and supranational norms in economic gov‐
ernance: If the national parliaments are the ultimate
sovereigns on budgetary policy, they are simultaneously
limited on political options by the EMU financial criteria.
The democratic legitimacy is also weakened by the fact
that the EP has neither formal competencies in coordi‐
nating and supervising SGPmechanisms nor in themone‐
tary policy. The ECB institutional independence from any
political EU organ, not only undermines accountability of
the monetary policy, as well as remits a highly influen‐
tial policy in national politics to a technocratised scope of
action (Snell, 2016). And the responses to the Euro crisis
have strengthened ECB role without modifying account‐
ability processes (Heidebrecht, 2021).
The Eurozone crisis unveiled those institutional dys‐
functions, making quite evident the structural inade‐
quacy of the EMU to address international economic
downturns, as well as the high systemic risk of the
unregulated European banking. Moreover, it was also
clear that its political economy consolidated two differ‐
ent and antagonist, but interdependent, models of eco‐
nomic development in the EU—exporting competitive
economies/creditor States versus weak and low competi‐
tive economies/debtor States (Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018,
pp. 5–6; Reis, 2016, pp. 46–48). While the former accu‐
mulated liquidity and needed to capitalise it, the lat‐
ter needed credit for public investment and to boost
the economy. Although antagonism could coexist in eco‐
nomic growth scenarios, it proved unsustainable with
the crisis (Sánchez‐Cuenca, 2017, p. 357).
4. Addressing the Eurozone and Covid‐19 Crises
Empirical analysis consists of twoparts: a summary of the
measures to tackle the crises and the other the argument
of the hypothesis. The EUhas addressed the Eurozone cri‐
sis with emergency financial measures and legal reforms
to correct the EMU governance structure. Backed by
loans from the IMF and the EU, the first consisted
of bailout programmes approved for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, under conditions for cor‐
recting macroeconomic imbalances (Parker & Tsarouhas,
2018, p. 2). Required to be achieved in the short term, it
involved a deflationary policy without compensation for
securing levels of demand—except for the ECB purchase
programme (ECB, 2012), aggravating economic recession
and social exclusion to the extent that IMF later recog‐
nised the exaggeration of the deflationary policy (Elliot,
Inman, & Smith, 2013).
Concerning legal reforms, the six‐pack (2011) and
two‐pack (2013) programmes reinforced the financial cri‐
teria with stricter rules for national budgetary policy and
new governance procedures to operationalise strength‐
ened coordination and surveillance. The Fiscal Compact
(Gouveia, 2018, p. 123) completed this package by requir‐
ing a binding national law to make the strengthened
SGP provisions effective (art. no. 3(2), TSCG). To address
the problem of systemic risk in Eurozone banks, a bank‐
ing union was launched, still unfinished, ensuring single
supervisory and resolutionmechanisms (Pereira& Sousa,
2018, pp. 81–96).
Regarding the Covid‐19 crisis, the first measure was
the adoption of the general escape clause which pro‐
vided for full flexibility available in the SGP in severe
downturns (Council Regulation of 8 November 2011,
2011; European Commission, 2020b; European Council,
2020a; European Parliament Regulation of 16 November
2011, 2011). Additionally, financial funds were made
available: a first loan of €200 billion for businesses
through the European Investment Bank (2020), and a
second temporary loan‐based instrument of up to €240
billion by the Eurogroup, through the ESM (Eurogroup,
2020). In March, the ECB announced a €750 billion
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (ECB, 2020a),
reinforced in June by €600 billion as a result of falling
inflation (ECB, 2020b).
The ground‐breaking EU response was the approval
by the European Council in July of the European
Commission’s “Next Generation EU” proposal, a €750
billion recovery plan (European Council, 2020b) divided
into grants and loans to be made operational through
various financial instruments (European Commission,
2020a), framed as an addition to the €1,074 trillion
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Although the
European Council’s approval was only possible after
a revision reducing the initial amount proposed for
grants from €500 to €350 billion (Boffey & Rankin, 2020;
Rankin, 2020), this may be an historical agreement to
boost integration, making it a step forward to creating
European public debt and fiscal competences (European
Commission, 2020a; European Council, 2020b).
5. Hypothesising: Political Oversizing of Economically
Hegemonic States
Departing from a PT theory‐testing approach, argumen‐
tation to the hypothesis is structured along a diagno‐
sis of causal inferences based on three derivations of
the democratic deficit: (1) junctural constraints, (2) insti‐
tutional constraints and (3) constitutional constraints
(Figure 1). The first one relates to the influence of
critical economic junctures on the increase of political
over‐power of the richest States, mainly through the
financial markets pressure that activate economic path‐
dependency in the EU; the second one relates to the
secrecy of bargaining and discussions, strengthening the
political power of stronger economies and depoliticisa‐
tion. Finally, the third one builds on the status of a de‐
European Commission.
5.1. Junctural Constraints
This causal event acts as a political power booster of
the most powerful economic states in economic crisis,
towards the urgency of weaker economies to choose
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Figure 1. Causal inference supporting the hypothesis: repercussion of democratic deficit into the political power of hege‐
monic economies happens through junctural constraints (related with the economic and financial crisis features), institu‐
tional constraints and constitutional constraints.
the least bad policy (see Figure 2). This relies upon
the assumption that Eurozone and Covid‐19 crises are
critical junctures. Unleashed by the external shock of
the 2008 global crisis, the Eurozone debt crisis placed
the EMU’s historical path‐dependencies under instability
and threat, posing the need for decisions on emergency
financial measures and new institutional arrangements
in three policy areas (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422). As a
moment of great uncertainty, avenues for fundamental
revision are opened, which can leverage a rupture or
just a transitional period, that may not culminate in a
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Figure 2. Causal inference of the 1st constraint: Junctural constraints actwith financialmarket pressures or effects of severe
economic downturns, external to the EU, but activating other two causal mechanisms internal to EU, with economic and
monetary path‐dependency and the result of this, the exclusion of a no measure scenario.
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The Covid‐19 pandemic reached the EU also as an exter‐
nal shock, first in the form of a health crisis, that spilled
over to an economic crisis. As long as the economic con‐
sequences turned clear, with a symmetric (and not asym‐
metric, like in 2008) expected impact, Member States
perceived they were facing an existential hazard to the
single market and the EU itself (Lady & Tsarahouas,
2020, pp. 1041–1043). Both crises required extraordi‐
nary responses, but whereas in the former it is gener‐
ally assumed, despite arguments that ECB made an ide‐
ological change (Braun, 2015, pp. 431–436), that there
was not a policy paradigm shift—rather an incremental
change through the persistence of policies and histor‐
ical institutional mechanisms (Heinrich & Kutter, 2013;
Verdun, 2015)—during the Covid‐19 pandemic there
appeared to be a learning process that led to substantial
policy change (Lady & Tsarahouas, 2020, pp. 144–151).
But if this historical institutionalist approach to crit‐
ical junctures explains policy change or permanence, it
is not sufficient to clarify if the implied institutional tra‐
jectories altered (Schmidt, 2020, p. 1181). By relating
junctural constraints with answers to both crises, in a
comparative perspective, it is intended to demonstrate
that the supposed learning process by some political
agents in Covid‐19 does not suggest evolution on institu‐
tional mechanisms, and thus not in the inherent demo‐
cratic deficit.
Despite the evidence of path‐dependency (Capoccia,
2015; Stark, 2018) on economic damage during the
Eurozone debt crisis, the financial urgency had the poten‐
tial for greater losses for weaker economies. The legal
and political answers provided did not change the
EMU ordoliberal political economy paradigm (Hillebrand,
2015), with deficit economies carrying the burden of a
rapid financial adjustment (Hillebrand, 2015, pp. 16–17).
While it’s true that those States reported historical finan‐
cial imbalances, the crisis also showed that the eco‐
nomic EMU path‐dependency was sustained in two
dichotomic models of growth, underpinning a ‘federal’
currency with which they all capitalise their economic
structural position.
The interest of the creditor economies in facili‐
tating credit to the deficit ones expressed that path‐
dependency, since guaranteeing liquidity to the latter
could systematically guarantee liquidity to the banking
creditors of the former (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter,
2016, p. 828). An alternative argument is that threat‐
ened Member States could veto solutions. This is true.
But ‘junctural constraints’ as a causal event answer
this. If the Troika memoranda were not accepted and a
Member State would leave Eurozone, national economic
losses would be higher than the austerity imposed, given
the pressure from the credit markets and rating agencies.
If in theory they could use the veto, in practice the EMU
path‐dependency of this crisis, considering themore frag‐
ile position of weaker economies, gave no alternative.
Greece is an example thereof. Despite government
attempts to renegotiate the memorandum to reduce
social consequences and cyclical economic impacts, the
alternative bailout plan presented by the finance min‐
ister, considered credible by some counterparts, was
rejected by the Eurogroup and the European Council
(Varoufakis, 2017, pp. 389–422). Even the national ref‐
erendum that denied the memorandum terms had no
impact on intergovernmental bargaining. In view of the
worsening of the financial situation, to the extent that
the national cash withdrawals and ECB banking liquid‐
ity guarantees would be limited, Greece had no choice
but to accept severe national solutions (Varoufakis,
2017, pp. 423–431). Even considering the historical self‐
responsibility of Greek debt and budget deficit (Gkasis,
2018, pp. 95–102), macroeconomic interdependency is
a fact in the single currency, and bankruptcy or exit from
the Eurozone would not only have dramatic economic
effects for Athens, but also a significant impact on sur‐
plus economies, like Germany (Moury, 2016, p. 74).
The same political hegemonic influence of the
strongest economies applies to Covid‐19. Faced with the
pressure on health services and the economy, govern‐
ments had no choice but to increase public spending,
leading to general national budget deficits (Arnold &
Fleming, 2020; European Commission, 2020c), a back‐
ground for resorting to the escape clause in the SGP.
Although this clause was only introduced in the six‐pack
amendment following the 2008 crisis, in practice the
same solution could have been achieved in the debt cri‐
sis. As the European Council is the decision‐making body
on the correction procedures of deficits, it could have
adopted, protected by the SGP regulations which do not
define correction periods (Council Regulation of 7 July
1997, 1997a, 1997b), longer time frames for budgetary
adjustments, relieving social and economic damage to
debtor states.
Furthermore, the different nature of this crisis has
made richer economies opt for different solutions.While
in the Eurozone the financial systemic risk could be
solvedwithmeasures directed to debtor countries, when
it comes to Covid‐19 the situation is different. It has
affected all Member States alike, although some do have
stronger structures to recover from it (Khan & Arnold,
2020). Secondly, reaching the world market, it has high
potential to affect exporting economies in the EU27
(European Commission, 2020d, 2020e). Thirdly, a repeti‐
tion of the Eurozone austerity could seriously question
the benefits of being in the Euro, making it politically
unsustainable, because the damages of exiting could be
lower than those of a new austerity (“The Eurozone
nine,” 2020; “The new channel of Eurozone instability,”
2020). The perception that the single market was under
a symmetric shock, posing a serious existential threat to
the EU, led politicians to engage in different institutional
answers (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020, pp. 1046, 1047).
It is therefore in Germany’s interest to support
the joint debt. From the moment ‘Coronabonds’ was
on the Eurogroup agenda, while the prominent ‘fru‐
gal four’ (Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden)
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were decisively against it, Germany opted for a dis‐
crete stance as the pandemic was evolving and con‐
sequences were not quite clear. Later in May, Angela
Merkel undertook with France to support the European
Commission’s recovery plan of €500 billion in grants
(Boffey, 2020), and the ‘frugal four’ accepted it in July
(European Council, 2020b).
Path‐dependency was thus a driver for the Covid‐19
outcomes, but path‐dependency was also observed in
the Eurozone crisis and, despite emergency financial
measures taken, the issue of joint debt as medium/long‐
term solution for EMU governance was revealed by EU
institutions (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2012;
European Parliament Resolution of 15 February 2012,
2012) but was not followed up. Germany’s support was
the element of change in Covid‐19, dragging the ‘frugal
four.’ Nevertheless, even the approved solution was not
an optimal one, which leads to the second causal event.
5.2. Institutional Constraints
This causal event is based on two institutional decision‐
making characteristics: unanimous voting, capitalising
economic into political ‘representative’ power, and
the secrecy of intergovernmental bargaining, making
national interest a driver of debate to the detriment of
ideology (see Figure 3).
Unanimous votingmakes decision dependent on one
or a few Member States, equivalent to a minority of
the population. While in the Eurozone crisis this was
not a blatant issue, as a group of northern countries
around Germany rejected expansionary policies against
southern Member States with France (Schoeller, 2019,
pp. 131, 132), this situation is clear in the Covid‐19.
The unanimity rule empowered fewMember States (the
‘frugal four’) to influence the reach of outcomes (Zalan,
2020), with consensus reached only with a significant
reduction of the initial proposal and concessions relat‐
ing budgetary contributions. Obviously, in parliamen‐
tary and open debates, negotiation must also occur.
The point here is that unanimity oversized the will of
few political actors, representing a minority of the pop‐
ulation. Even changing their extreme initial position to
support the EU public debt, the four States with low
population density but strong economies were able to
influence the Commission’s proposal for a suboptimal
achievement in a way that could not otherwise be pos‐
sible if there had been a majority voting. An alternative
institutional argument is that the veto can be exercised
by both richer and poorer states to reject a suboptimal
outcome. But economic junctural constraints undermine
its feasibility, as argued in the previous causal event. For
weaker economies, the least bad outcome is preferable
to no solution at all.
The second causal event relating to the secrecy
and informality of the intergovernmental bargaining is
argued to limit or even prevent ideological debate in
favour of nationalist arguments, thereby restricting alter‐
native policies and legitimising the institutionalised eco‐
nomic policy through the official press releases and state‐
ments following the Eurogroup and European Council
meetings. An example is the failed attempt of the
Greek Minister of Finance in 2015 to formally present
and discuss in the Eurogroup an alternative plan to
the Troika memorandum, which was blocked by the
Eurogroup president. Given the absence of formal rules



































































Figure 3. Causal inference for the 2nd constraint: Institutional constraints act with causal effects that may be common to
other policy areas, with unanimity vote and secrecy effects on the political transparency and equity of decision‐making,
which in economic governance translates economic power into political power.
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for Eurogroup meetings (Abels, 2018), he was unable to
oppose the president’s blockades (Varoufakis, 2017, pp.
430–431). Ideological debate on the political economy
of the EMU was abolished, which could have resulted in
some peers perceiving that different economic policies
could achieve equal outcomes. Informality and secrecy,
as in European Council meetings, limit or even prevent
ideological debate, diminishing the ability to persuade
public opinion and peers with alternative policies, turn‐
ing the process more technocratic than political, one of
the causes of democratic deficit (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, p.
132). Political economy, the core of political competition
in Western democracies, is reduced to institutionalised
technocracy in the Eurozone governance.
This causal event is not a denial of the legitimacy of
intergovernmental bodies to defend national interests,
or that national interest is not legitimate in a shared
sovereignty polity like the EU. The crux of the matter is
that when a Member State wants to use ideology to con‐
duct a debate, argue about national interests and envi‐
sion the EU’s future, it is highly constrained by institu‐
tional norms. The EP is of course the EU’s politicised insti‐
tution par excellence, and a counterargument is that ide‐
ological debate is conducted therein. Nevertheless, in
EMU governance, the EP has no formal powers and even
in the approval of the Covid‐19 recovery plan requiring
the EP’s decision, it does not have the media impact like
the European Council. Moreover, it is as legitimate for
governments to use ideological arguments in national
competition as it is at the EU level.
This causal event does not presuppose that ideo‐
logical debate is forbidden or never takes place in the
Eurogroup or the European Council. Itmerely argues that
informality and secrecy limits the occurrence and the
potential of the political reach of ideological arguments.
As Kutter (2020) concludes, despite the discursive politi‐
cisation in media and national fora, with alternative nar‐
ratives about the Eurozone crisis and scenarios for the
future of EMU, they did not reach EU policy‐making and
institutional discourse. Taking into consideration a hypo‐
thetical situation in Covid‐19, if debate were public there
could be arguments explaining that the joint debt does
not mean direct transfers of creditor to debtor countries,
as the traditional MFF; and that EU fiscal competences
could combat tax evasion and regulate themarket for the
sake of the collective interest. If mediatised, such debate
could improve public opinion and counterbalance gov‐
ernmental messages for domestic political competition
purposes (Darroch, 2020).
5.3. Constitutional Constraints
The last causal event relies in one of Hix and Hoyland’s
(2011, p. 131) arguments of the democratic deficit, that
an unelected President of the Commission is deprived of
the power to use the will of citizens to conduct negoti‐
ations. As power depends solely or heavily on intergov‐
ernmental structures, and as the president of the EU’s
executive body does not ensue from a direct represen‐
tative majority and is not subject to an electoral pro‐
cess after the legislature, she/he is unable to politically
use citizens’ demands to oppose the European Council’s
power game and strengthen his/her intermediation role
in the bargaining (see Figure 4). As he/she is not entitled
to be a political intermediary of the EU’s constituencies
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Figure 4. Causal inference of the 3rd constraint: Constitutional constraints derive from the absence of an election‐based
executive power, which in economic governance perpetuates economic power as the driver of change.
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national interests and efforts are mainly channelled to
reaching consensus. This, again, contributes to depoliti‐
cised outcomes of the EU economic governance.
It is true that even empowered by a majority voting,
Commission could not succeed in approving different
outcomes, but representative power could have effects
in the medium term, influencing a change for the next
legislature. We recall that in the Eurozone crisis, joint
debt issuance was called for by the Barroso Commission
(European Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) and the
European Council Presidency (European Council, 2012)
as a structural measure for the Eurozone. While lit‐
erature points to the Commission’s lack of leadership
to formalise a proposal (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 132–135),
the fact is that it faced a status quo headed by the
firm German opposition (“Merkel on eurobonds,” 2012;
Traynor & Wintour, 2012), leading it to weigh the costs
of going against it (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 135–141). Even
the Juncker Commission did not succeed when mak‐
ing a similar proposal (European Commission, 2015),
despite the discussion on a common budget for the
Eurozone. The Von der Leyen Commission succeeded in
2020, with the EU’s constitutional design remaining the
same, only with the shift in German’s position being dif‐
ferent (Boffey, 2020). But while the Covid‐19 responses
appear to be more equitable for the EU Member States
and trigger a policy change in economic governance, this
does not remove constitutional constraints. The shift in
Covid‐19 outcomes were as much allowed by the hege‐
monic economy as was restrained by the remaining ‘fru‐
gal four,’ managing to refute the Commission’s proposal
in a way that a majority rule would have found difficult.
The hypothetical power of a majority‐based Commis‐
sion gains ground when considering the EP adoption, in
April 2020, of a resolution calling for a massive recovery
package based on the reform of the EU’s own resources
through enhanced fiscal capacity (European Parliament,
2020), or that the EP had already accepted in 2012
eurobonds could be a medium‐term solution for stabil‐
ising the Eurozone (European Parliament Resolution of
15 February 2012, 2012), exercising leadership on the
issue, but restricted by the limits of constitutional design
(Schoeller, 2019, pp. 150–157).
Obviously, in the field of a shared sovereignty polity,
the citizens’ chamber is balanced with the states’ repre‐
sentative power; however, recalling the second causal
event, the unanimity rule causes disproportionate power
in favour of a smaller group of economically hegemonic
states, thus undermining the Commission’s ability to
push for politicised‐based results to the detriment of
nationalist‐based ones. Of course, the opposite would
not be a guarantee that the results would always meet
the demands of the citizens, but if this was not the case
the electorate could have a say in the choice of the next
executive, which would appease the issue of democratic
legitimacy (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 548).
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Studies of democratic legitimacy about the EU abound.
What this interdisciplinary research aims to demonstrate
is that the damage of the EU’s democratic shortcoming
aggravates, by spilling over into the field of economic
governance, tending to permanently convert economic
power into political ‘representative’ power, in the result
of the structural national positions in institutional path
dependencies of EMU, thus reproducing economic and
political inequalities. If responses to the Covid‐19 crisis
suggest that a policy paradigm shift occurred, this does
not translate to a change in this state of affairs.
The research confirms the spillover and path‐
dependency logic of integration, leveraged by the Franco‐
German axis at critical junctures. However, this study
adds to the debate the conclusion that democracy has
been especially perverted in economic critical junctures,
when decisions are either blocked or unblocked by the
strongest national economies in their interest, and the
EU economic governance is a decisive perpetrator of this.
If EMU’s institutional mechanisms paved the way for
two different models of economic growth with antago‐
nist but interdependent interests, economic critical junc‐
tures tended to perpetuate the political over‐hegemony
of previous surplus economies, when one considers their
democratic representativeness. Even admitting that the
economic policies achieved can also be in the interests
of loss‐making economies, the problem is that the con‐
stitutional design allows the perpetuation of logic of
economic power corresponding to political power, disre‐
garding political representation as such.
Nevertheless, it is admissible that the Covid‐19 cri‐
sis led to different governmental perceptions and a dis‐
ruptive answer by the EU agents. Its outputs opened
avenues for a change in the political economy of the
Eurozone, with prospects of a fiscal union, redistribu‐
tion, and joint debt at the supranational level, as Ladi
and Tsarouhas (2020) conclude. But this was again a
decision triggered and conditioned by the hegemonic
economies, either the decision of advancing for a dif‐
ferent solution or the difficulties posed to restrain the
original proposal. The literature explains this as a conse‐
quence of the structural indeterminism of critical junc‐
tures (Braun, 2015, p. 423), boosting the dominant nar‐
ratives and empowering (even more) the most powerful
actors (Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–125). It is plau‐
sible that the German position was essential to deter‐
mine the responses to Covid‐19 (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020,
p. 1052), but such an assumption reinforces our argu‐
ment on the permanence of institutional mechanisms,
allowing the economic hegemonic states to be decisive
actors. Despite the different results, the institutional sta‐
tus quo hasn’t changed.
Schmidt (2020, pp. 1180–1182) reminds that if the
historical tracing of responses to critical junctures based
on rational choice and constructivist approaches can
provide explanations for policy change, that is only a
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partial analysis, insufficient to demonstrate if there was
a reframing of institutional mechanisms and constitu‐
tional norms by the actors. If we agree that Covid‐19
has resulted in policy‐learning, we put into question if
political ideology was a factor for policy shift and the
change of Germany’s position, as Ladi and Tsarouhas
argue (2020, p. 1045). We tried to demonstrate that it
was the particularity of the Covid‐19 crisis that posed
hegemonic actors in a non‐alternative solution, or the
possibility of the alternative solution being too danger‐
ous for the survival of the EU, the single market, and
thus for national economic growth strategies. Outputs
were not the consequence of a voluntary ideological
option, resulting from political competition at the EU
level. While we acknowledge that from the Eurozone
crisis a process of policy learning happened, boosted
by the national politicization on the issue, with growing
representativeness of Eurosceptic parties, and that such
politicization is gradually reaching the EU institutions
(Schmidt, 2020, p. 1186), this research argues that the
Covid‐19 decision‐making itself was rather self‐interest
based than politicized based. Politicization means ideo‐
logical contestation and competition based on majority
dialects of power. If it happens in the EP, in the European
Council bargaining, the goal is rather to reach unanimity
to meet the consensus.
In Covid‐19, path‐dependencies and heightened
awareness of self‐interest dependent on common inter‐
est led to a step further in integration, nevertheless the
consequent increased EU economic and financial pow‐
ers can also be a time‐bomb waiting to explode anytime
a crisis generates junctural conditions to. Considering
the new involved scope of EU fiscal competences, in the
short term it may address citizens’ demands and con‐
ceal the democratic issue, but not in the medium/long
term. It is placed for the future the need to decide
on the levels of taxation and their scope. The fiscal
policy is at the heart of the governments of Western
European democracies and is a typical element of par‐
tisan competition and public discontent. If future deci‐
sions are subject to the current constitutional and insti‐
tutional mechanisms, it will replicate national economic
conflicts, and the dialectics of power will remain the
same. Van Loon (2021) case‐study clarifies the influ‐
ence of domestic preferences on EU taxation issues.
Decisions that should be politically based will continue
to be secured by territorial‐based preferences. Thus, if
the results of Covid‐19 mitigate democratic legitimacy
for some time, it may just be postponing and enhancing
it in the next crisis. The prospects for a redistributive EU
should not be at the expense of democracy, putting the
competences that should be in the field of politics under
a kind of technocratic federalism (Habermas, 2013, p. 5).
In futuremoments of economic downturn, should the EU
fail, what would be questioned is not the continuity of
the EU executive, since the electorate cannot play a deci‐
sive role in choosing an alternative, but the EU itself as a
political system. This is at the heart of Eurosceptic claims.
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